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We evaluate a recent U.S. initiative to include the social cost of carbon (SCC) in 
regulatory decisions. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first systematic analysis 
of the extent to which applying the SCC has affected national policy. We examine all 
economically significant federal regulations since 2008, and obtain an unexpected 
result: putting a value on changes in carbon dioxide emissions does not generally affect 
the ranking of the preferred policy compared with the status quo. Overall, we find little 
evidence that using the social cost of carbon has mattered for the actual choice of policy 
in the U.S. This is true even for policies explicitly aimed at reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions. We offer some possible explanations for the patterns observed in the data. 
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Does the Social Cost of Carbon Matter?: 
Evidence from U.S. Policy 
 
Robert W. Hahn and Robert A. Ritz 
1. Introduction 
Economists have long supported policies that incentivize individuals and organizations 
to consider the full costs of their actions on society (Coase, 1960). This is particularly 
true where there may be large divergences between private and social costs, as is the 
case with many environmental problems. Almost a century ago, Pigou (1920) argued 
that one way to appropriately incentivize economic agents to consider the full costs of 
their actions is to impose taxes on activities that fully reflect their marginal damages to 
society.  
In the case of climate change, a growing number of economists have argued for 
introducing market-based mechanisms, such as taxes or cap-and-trade systems, as 
ways of limiting greenhouse gas emissions (Anthoff et al., 2011b; Metcalf and 
Weisbach, 2009; and Stavins, 2007). These mechanisms have been tried in various 
places, notably Europe, with varying degrees of success (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). 
Absent an economy-wide incentive scheme, governments can account for greenhouse 
gas emissions by adding a measure of the marginal damages from climate change in 
benefit-cost analyses. Economists have argued that such environmental damages 
should be explicitly included in benefit-cost analysis to the extent that they can be 
quantified (Arrow et al., 1996). For example, a government might consider a regulation 
to increase fuel economy standards for automobiles, and include the reduction in 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions as an additional benefit that has a monetary value.  
To perform such an analysis, that government would need to attach a value to a ton of 
CO2 reductions. One such value is the “social cost of carbon”, or SCC, which measures 
the monetized damages associated with emitting a specified quantity of carbon dioxide 
emissions into the atmosphere (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). There has been much 
work on the appropriate value of the social cost of carbon (Tol, 2009, Anthoff et al., 
2011a, Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton, 2013). For example, Greenstone, Kopits, 
and Wolverton (2013) note that the U.S. government used a central estimate of $21 per 
metric ton (in 2007$) for global damages from CO2 emissions in 2010.1 
                                            
1 A more recent update by the U.S. Government argues that the social cost of carbon in 
regulatory analysis should be at least 50 percent higher than initial estimates 
(Interagency Working Group, 2013). These new values for the SCC are used in 
analyses of regulations beginning in 2013.  
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While there has been much debate on the appropriate value of the social cost of 
carbon, there has been much less work on the actual use of the social cost of carbon in 
the design of policy. Watkiss and Downing (2008) examine the social cost of carbon in 
UK policy while Watkiss and Hope (2011) examine more broadly how the social cost of 
carbon is used in regulatory deliberations. Watkiss and Hope (2011) note that several 
countries use a “global” social cost of carbon, which incorporates damages for global 
carbon emissions for different regulatory activities; examples include the United States, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland, and Italy.2 They offer a number of 
interesting insights on the SCC including: how its value has changed over time; the 
importance of SCC values in different sectors; trade-offs in using ranges and point 
estimates for the SCC; and examples where use of the SCC appears to have changed 
the results of a particular benefit-cost analysis. Kopp and Mignone (2012) examine 
several U.S. rules with energy efficiency standards, and offer suggestions on how the 
application of the SCC to regulatory policy could be improved. The analysis to date has 
been largely based on examples, rather than an exhaustive review of all regulations or 
policies. Existing studies are not designed to test the overall impact of using the SCC on 
a nation’s policy choices. Our paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. 
The question this paper will examine is what role the social cost of carbon has played in 
U.S. federal regulatory policy. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first systematic 
analysis of the extent to which applying the social cost of carbon has affected national 
policy. Our sample includes the entire set of significant federal regulations that consider 
the social cost of carbon in the United States, beginning in 2008 – when this policy was 
first implemented. These regulations typically have an annual economic impact of at 
least $100 million.3  
                                            
2 Whether or not countries should use a global SCC is an open question. With the 
exception of climate policy, most U.S. regulatory policy focuses on the impact on U.S. 
citizens. Perhaps this is because most U.S. regulations primarily affect its citizens. Still, 
other policy arenas in the U.S. that affect the welfare of citizens in other countries—
such as defense, trade, and monetary policy—appear to be guided primarily by an 
assessment of the costs and benefits on U.S. citizens. Thus, it is not obvious why 
climate change should be treated differently. See Gayer and Viscusi (2014) for a recent 
analysis of this issue in the context of U.S. climate policy. For a formal economic model 
of why using the global cost of carbon is almost never optimal, see Hahn and Ritz 
(2013). For an ethical defense that is sympathetic to its use, see Broome (2012). 
3 We use the term “economically significant federal regulation” to denote a “significant 
regulatory action” as defined by Executive Order 12866. These include actions that may 
result in a rule that has “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or 
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal 
governments or communities” (3 C.F.R. 638).  
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To assess how outcomes were affected, we examine net benefit estimates provided by 
the U.S. government for all significant federal regulatory policies from 2008 through 
2013. We consider 53 regulatory policies, with and without including estimates of the 
benefits associated with changes in carbon dioxide emissions. Over half of the policies 
we consider set energy conservation standards for commercial or residential items such 
as electric motors or dishwashers.  Most of the remaining policies set limits on 
hazardous pollutants from large entities, such as petroleum refineries or electric utilities.  
We examine whether inclusion of the benefits from carbon dioxide emissions changes 
the sign of the net benefits for each regulatory policy. We find that the social cost of 
carbon was used in many rulemakings. We also find that, for some rulemakings, the 
benefits from reducing carbon dioxide represent a significant fraction of total net 
benefits for the policy that was selected. However, we find the impact of including the 
social cost carbon on regulatory policy appears to have been limited. This finding holds 
for a wide range of regulations, including those rules that were explicitly motivated by 
climate change considerations. 
Specifically, we obtain the result that including the benefits from estimated changes in 
carbon dioxide emissions does not generally change the sign of quantified net benefits 
relative to the status quo. Put differently, in almost all cases, government estimates of 
net benefits are positive both with and without the social cost of carbon. This finding 
provides support for the view that the SCC has not had a big effect on actual U.S. policy 
to date. 
We then consider whether the SCC changes the ranking of different policy alternatives 
within a given regulatory policy based on their expected net benefits. In other words, 
has the SCC led to changes in the details of a regulatory policy? We find some 
evidence that it does change economic rankings of alternatives in a small number of 
cases. Whether this led to a change in the actual regulatory decision is less clear 
because, as we discuss below, there are many factors that go into such a decision, not 
simply the expected net benefits of the policy.  
Based on this evidence and analysis, we argue that the SCC does not appear to have 
had a substantial impact on U.S. policy between 2008, when it was first used, and the 
beginning of 2013. We consider explanations for our finding related to the political 
economy of regulation. We also suggest how the government’s approach to benefit-cost 
analysis could be modified to increase the expected net benefits associated with 
regulation.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the analytical approach, and Section 
3 presents the main results. Section 4 concludes and suggests areas for future 
research.  
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2. Empirical methodology 
We begin by discussing the different ways in which incorporating the social cost of 
carbon could affect regulatory decision-making, and the extent to which these can be 
measured empirically. In general, the introduction of the SCC could affect (i) the 
regulations that are considered, (ii) the set of alternatives that are considered in 
designing a regulation, (iii) the ranking of those alternatives based on estimates of net 
benefits (i.e., the difference between benefits and costs), and (iv) the choice of a 
particular regulatory policy by the agency. 
We cannot observe the regulations under consideration, but do not believe that 
introducing the SCC has had much, if any, impact on these regulations. The reason is 
that the regulations under consideration are generally determined by laws or court 
decisions that require agencies to take a regulatory action. We also cannot observe 
whether the specific policy alternatives considered in a regulation were affected by 
introduction of the SCC, but we were unable to find discussions in regulations 
suggesting that this factor was prominent.  
However, we can observe how the SCC affected the ranking of alternatives based on 
net benefits for a number of regulatory policies, and we can also observe the choice of a 
particular regulatory policy. We discuss our approach to obtaining and analyzing this 
data in detail below. 
Our methodological approach for assessing the impact of the SCC relies on benefit-cost 
analyses prepared by regulatory agencies in the United States (Hahn and Tetlock, 
2008). The United States requires selected regulatory agencies to assess benefits and 
costs for all significant federal regulations, and to the extent possible, “propose or adopt 
a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended 
regulation justify its costs” (3 C.F.R. 638). 
The search algorithm for identifying specific benefit-cost analyses involved three steps. 
First, we identified the set of rules in our main sample by searching for rules that 
included a discussion of the social cost of carbon. Second, we identified benefit-cost 
analyses within those rules that permitted a comparison of the policy choice made by 
the government with the status quo. Third, we identified benefit-cost analyses within 
those rules that allowed us to examine whether the relative ranking of policy alternatives 
changes with the inclusion of benefits from CO2.  
To identify rules in the main sample, we searched the U.S. Federal Register (which lists 
all regulations) for rules containing the phrase “social cost of carbon” or “social cost of 
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CO2.” We searched for proposed and final rules.4 We then searched regulations.gov 
(which contains all supporting material for regulations) for supporting documents 
containing the same phrases. When we found documents that corresponded to rules 
not found in the Federal Register, we added the rules associated with these documents 
to our sample. 
We included proposed rules in our main sample only where final rules had not been 
issued, because proposed rules are usually very similar to final rules. We found rules 
from three regulatory agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Transportation (DOT).    
We searched all rules for complete benefit-cost information, with and without the 
economic benefits of changes in CO2 emissions included.  We found 23 proposed and 
29 final rules between May 2008 and April 2013 that provided an estimate of quantified 
benefits and costs for the policy selected by the agency.5  Sixteen proposed rules were 
associated with final rules. We did not include the analyses from these proposed rules 
in our main sample because in most cases they were very similar to the analyses in the 
final rule. This left a total of 36 rules (29 plus 23 less 16) in our main sample. While we 
did not include the matching proposed rules in this sample, we did check these 
proposed rules to see that they are consistent with the findings presented below. We 
report these results in a sensitivity analysis.  
Our main analysis compared net benefits of the policy actually selected with the status 
quo. Since rules often contained multiple benefit-cost estimates for a given policy, we 
developed a procedure for choosing between them. We have retained a fuller record of 
our work in an Excel spreadsheet, available upon request.  The spreadsheet contains a 
complete list of the rules we reviewed along with explanations of our judgments about 
what to include. 
We identified benefit-cost analyses at the highest level of aggregation for which the 
agency provided sufficient information on net benefits. We chose the highest level of 
aggregation to be conservative on the size of the sample. For example, we recorded 
                                            
4 A proposed rule is a regulation that that the government has proposed, but has not 
received final approval from the executive branch. A final rule is a regulation that the 
government has finalized and is scheduled to be implemented. 
5 We found one rule with no net benefits. EPA asserted that owners of electricity 
generating units would meet certain greenhouse-gas emissions standards even in the 
rule’s absence, so the rule would not affect their behavior. We did not include this rule in 
our sample. We also found five final rules that provided incomplete information on costs 
and benefits.  In one case, DOT was unable to estimate net benefits; in two others, 
DOE chose not to estimate net benefits for the policy it selected because it had 
eliminated all other legally permissible alternatives. In the final two cases, EPA and 
DOT did not discount net benefits at 3%.  
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fuel economy standards for heavy-duty vehicles as a single observation rather than 
recording separate observations for pickup trucks and vans, vocational vehicles, and 
tractors. This approach yielded a total of 53 benefit-cost analyses, which are 
summarized in Table A1 in the online appendix.  
The next step in our analysis was to compare the net benefits of selected and rejected 
policy alternatives with one another to assess the impact of including CO2 benefits on 
the ranking of policy alternatives. We first identified regulatory policies that quantified 
net benefits for at least two policy alternatives. In choosing particular benefit-cost 
analyses, we continued to follow the procedures described above. For example, we 
chose the benefit-cost analyses at the highest level of aggregation provided by the 
agency. This approach yielded a total of 202 policy alternatives for 43 policies.  
We took all the information on benefits and costs in the rules as given. The only change 
we made to the benefit and cost estimates was to adjust all values to 2011 dollars by 
using the GDP Deflators published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2013).  
Rules generally used real discount rates of 3% and 7%, and we recorded both.  
Values for the social cost of carbon have changed over time. We recorded the value 
that was used in the benefit-cost analysis. The SCC was first used in regulatory analysis 
in 2008. In 2009, the government assembled an interagency working group to estimate 
values for the social cost of carbon and help bring consistency to values used by 
regulatory agencies. This group issued a report in 2010. Agencies then used these SCC 
values to estimate the benefits from reducing CO2 emissions for selected regulatory 
activities (Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton, 2013).  
The interagency report directs agencies to use a global social cost of carbon, which 
considers the global benefits accruing to all countries combined from reducing a ton of 
carbon dioxide. The central value specified by the report is $21 (in 2007$) per metric ton 
of CO2 emissions reduction in 2010.  It increases over time to reflect the greater 
marginal damages of global temperature changes associated with higher temperature 
levels. The discount rate used for determining the central value of the social cost of 
carbon is 3% (Interagency Working Group, 2010).  
From August 2009 until the release of the first interagency report, all agencies used a 
central value of $19 (in 2007$) per metric ton of CO2 emissions reduction in 2007. 
Before this, each agency chose its own SCC estimates. For example, EPA once used 
central estimates of $68 and $40 (2006$) for a ton of emissions in 2007. DOE once 
used a central estimate of $33 (2007$) for a ton of emissions in 2007. 
In some cases, an agency used both a global and a domestic SCC for valuation.  Unlike 
the global SCC value, the domestic value incorporates only benefits to the U.S., and is 
generally much lower than the global value. In those cases where a domestic value was 
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presented, we continued to record data on the benefits and costs for global values of 
the SCC. This choice is supported by the interagency report, which provides an 
estimate for the domestic SCC, but recommends that agencies use the global SCC in 
their central estimates (Interagency Working Group, 2010).  
Prior to the issuance of this report, however, DOE sometimes failed to draw a clear 
distinction between global and domestic values for the SCC.  The agency provided a 
range that included both, but stated that domestic values were likely to fall near the 
lower bound. Several rules used a range of $0 to $20. This approach made it impossible 
for us to separate the global estimates from the domestic ones, so we used the midpoint 
of the full range for our primary analysis. We also ran a sensitivity analysis in which we 
used the upper and lower bounds of the range. 
3. Results  
The quantitative analysis first examines whether use of the SCC has had an impact on 
the net benefits of the selected alternative compared with the status quo. It then 
examines whether use of the SCC has changed the relative ranking of policy 
alternatives, and whether this could have impacted policy. 
A. Comparing the selected alternative with the status quo 
A key result is that using the SCC in the regulatory analyses did not generally change 
the sign of the benefit-cost analysis for the selected alternative. This result is shown 
graphically in Figure 1, which shows the net benefits on a log scale at a 3% discount 
rate for the 50 benefit-cost analyses in the data set with positive net benefits (of a total 
of 53 analyses). The observations are ranked in terms of increasing net benefits. 
Regulatory policies are only reported here if they provided a net benefit calculation and 
if they valued CO2 emissions changes in that calculation. In cases where a range of net 
benefits was presented at a 3% discount rate, we report the mid-point of those net 
benefits. The use of the mid-point does not affect our qualitative conclusions.  
The three benefit-cost analyses we found for which net benefits were negative are not 
reported in this figure or Figure 2 (see below). The policies set limits on the emissions of 
hazardous air pollutants from commercial and institutional boilers and steam electric 
power generators.6 Net benefits remained negative even after including the value of 
CO2 benefits, consistent with the finding in Figure 1. EPA appears to have approved 
these policies because the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act require it to establish 
specific types of emissions standards for sources of hazardous pollutants. These 
                                            
6 Two of these policies are from the same regulation: they define effluent limitation 
standards for new and existing steam electric power generators. All three policies are 
starred in Table A1 in the online appendix. 
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regulatory decisions by EPA are consistent with regulatory executive orders that require 
agencies to select alternatives where benefits justify costs to the extent permitted by 
law. 
In addition to showing that the sign of the benefit-cost analysis does not change with the 
inclusion of CO2 benefits, Figure 1 reveals that the SCC has to date been applied to a 
very wide range of regulatory policies, for which net benefits vary over several orders of 
magnitude. The lowest net benefit for a regulatory policy was on the order of $10 million 
while a few regulatory policies had net benefits that approached $500 billion. 
Figure 2 takes the same regulatory policies shown in Figure 1, and computes CO2 
benefits as a percentage of total net benefits (but on an arithmetic scale). The CO2 
benefits average about 14% across all regulatory policies with a range of -2 to 70%. The 
cases for which the CO2 net benefits are negative, but for which overall net benefits are 
positive, reflect a small increase in CO2 emissions from greater energy usage. For 
example, the “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major 
Sources” cause a slight increase in CO2 emissions because boilers that meet the 
standards use slightly more energy than boilers that do not.   
Instead of asking whether including CO2 benefits changes the sign of net benefits for a 
particular policy, we can explore the incremental impact of including CO2 benefits for 
particular policies. From the data in Figure 1, we found that CO2 benefits account for 
30% or more of total benefits in 10% of the cases (5 out of 50); and CO2 benefits 
account for 20% or more of total benefits in 22% of the cases (11 out of 50). In this 
sense, the incremental contribution of estimated monetary CO2 benefits is a non-trivial 
portion of net benefits for some policies. 
We tried to explain the variation in CO2 benefits as a percentage of total net benefits 
across regulatory policies. We examined whether this difference might be explained by 
two factors – the agency proposing the regulatory policy and the major source of 
benefits from that policy. The major sources of benefits for regulatory policy were 
broken down into three categories: health benefits from reduced exposure to pollutants, 
fuel savings for vehicles and planes, and energy savings for equipment other than 
vehicles. We found that neither of these factors is important in explaining the variation in 
percentages across regulatory policies.7  
                                            
7 We also investigated a possible relationship between total net benefits and CO2 
benefits as a percentage of net benefits. We did not find strong evidence of a 
relationship between net benefits and CO2 benefits as a percentage of net benefits. For 
example, we regressed the percentage on levels and logarithms of total net benefits. 
The slope coefficient was negative and significant in the logarithmic regression, 
indicating that a 1% increase in total net benefits is associated (on average) with a 2% 
9 
The results for Figures 1 and 2 consider all rules that use the social cost of carbon. 
There are 3 rules that were explicitly motivated by climate change considerations. All 
are greenhouse gas emission standards for vehicles. Since each of these rules is 
estimated to yield substantial benefits from fuel savings for vehicle owners, each has 
positive net benefits before the addition of CO2 benefits. Consequently, restricting the 
analysis to these rules does not change our conclusions. 
We then considered the robustness of our conclusions in various dimensions, including 
changes in the discount rate; the level at which benefits and costs were aggregated; the 
use of different values for the SCC; and changes in the benefits associated with 
estimated fuel savings, which may be overstated. 
Changes in the discount rate generally did not affect the qualitative results. We did find 
one class of equipment for which introducing CO2 benefits at a 3% discount rate 
changed the sign of net benefits when costs and non-CO2 benefits were evaluated at a 
7% discount rate: Class B beverage vending machines.  Net benefits were relatively 
small in both cases, however; they went from -$3 million to $9 million with the inclusion 
of CO2 benefits in the calculation.  
We considered whether the results shown in Figures 1 and 2 apply to policies that are 
evaluated at a lower level of aggregation. For example, we checked whether CO2 
benefits changed the sign of net benefits of fuel economy standards for several 
subcategories of heavy-duty vehicles. We performed the same exercise on 72 distinct 
disaggregated policies in the rules in our sample. In 70 of these cases, we found that 
the addition of CO2 benefits did not change the sign of net benefits at a 3% or a 7% 
discount rate. The exceptions were vending machines and commercial air conditioning 
and heating equipment.  
We considered what would happen if there were changes in the value of the SCC 
employed. In this analysis, the answer is very little because most benefit-cost analyses 
we examined already pass a benefit-cost analysis without the addition of CO2 benefits, 
and in most cases, the CO2 benefits were positive.  
As a final sensitivity check, we considered one particular adjustment to the data 
regarding fuel savings, but did so using a bounding analysis. Fuel savings are a major 
benefit category in seven separate benefit-cost analyses included in five rules that we 
examined. However, there is some controversy over the correct way to account for fuel 
savings in certain purchases. Greenstone et al. (2013, p. 43) exclude private fuel 
                                                                                                                                             
reduction in CO2 benefits as a percentage of net benefits. Alternative specifications that 
we tried were not statistically significant. 
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savings because “many consider the question of how consumers account for fuel 
savings in their purchase decisions an unsettled empirical question.” 
Frequently, the value of fuel savings, and energy savings more generally, are based on 
engineering analysis. That may not be the right way to value such savings. For 
example, a consumer may value fuel savings from a new technology in an automobile, 
but she may also value other vehicle attributes, such as safety or lower emissions 
(Lave, 1984). If these other attributes are not taken into account in the benefit-cost 
analysis, then the rule may overstate the benefits by focusing on fuel savings alone. 
To address the issue that the estimated benefits from fuel savings may overstate actual 
benefits, we performed a sensitivity analysis on our data. We assumed the benefits from 
fuel savings were zero, which is likely to be an extreme assumption. We examined 7 
benefit-cost analyses by EPA and DOT that included fuel savings.  
 
These analyses covered greenhouse gas emissions standards and fuel economy 
standards for vehicles of different weights and model years. Each cited fuel savings as 
the greatest benefit of the standards in question. We found only 1 analysis in which CO2 
benefits played a decisive role (once fuel savings were omitted). This analysis covered 
greenhouse gas emissions standards for light-duty vehicles sold in model years 2017-
2025. 
 
Another interesting issue arises with EPA greenhouse gas standards for vehicles. When 
issuing these standards, EPA always performed a sensitivity analysis on its own data. It 
assumed that the standards would be extended indefinitely and measured the net 
benefits through 2050. In all 3 cases, large fuel savings benefits ensured that the 
standards had positive net benefits before the addition of CO2 benefits. When we 
excluded fuel savings benefits, however, we found that the addition of CO2 benefits 
always changed the sign of net benefits. While we think this analysis is useful as a 
bounding exercise, we think the assumption that the same standards will be in place for 
such a long time period is unrealistic, and may lead to an overstatement of the benefits 
of those standards. 
 
The preceding examples suggest that with a different, and perhaps more realistic, set of 
economic analyses, the SCC could have made a more pronounced difference in the 
selection of particular policies. In our conclusion below, we suggest a way of shedding 
light on this issue by doing independent analyses of all rulemakings. 
 
B. The SCC and the relative ranking of policy alternatives 
The analysis in Figures 1 and 2 focused on the impact of including CO2 benefits on the 
policy alternative that was actually selected within each regulation. As noted above, it is 
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possible that the inclusion of CO2 benefits affected the relative ranking of policy 
alternatives that the government considered, and this change in ranking led to a change 
in the selection of a particular policy alternative. 
We addressed this issue in two ways. First, we searched the regulatory analyses for a 
discussion of net benefits that would suggest that the inclusion of CO2 benefits was an 
important or decisive factor in selecting the final policy. We found no such discussion in 
our search, which does not lend support to the notion that use of the SCC was a critical 
factor in decision-making. Keywords and phrases used in our search included: social 
cost of carbon, CO2 emissions, and CO2 benefits. 
We also tried a quantitative approach to this problem. We searched for policy analyses 
of rules, and parts of rules, that provided benefit and cost information on both the 
selected alternative and at least one rejected alternative.8 This exercise revealed that 
there is widespread variation across regulatory agencies in the extent to which they 
quantify the benefits of changes in the value of carbon dioxide emissions.  
We encountered two difficulties in this exercise.  First, EPA rarely provided estimates of 
net benefits for alternatives, and DOT rarely provided estimates of CO2 benefits for 
alternatives. Even after checking regulatory impact analyses and technical support 
documents, we found sufficient information in only one-third of the rules issued by EPA 
or DOT.  We found sufficient information in all of the rules issued by DOE.  
Consequently, our data set for this exercise was heavily biased toward rules issued by 
DOE.9  
Second, agencies that did provide information on rejected alternatives often used a 
lower level of aggregation than they used in their presentation of selected alternatives. 
For example, DOE conducted three separate cost-benefit analyses for three different 
types of distribution transformers. Although the agency combined the three to obtain a 
net benefit estimate for the standards it selected, it did not do the same for standards it 
rejected. We addressed this problem by using the highest level of aggregation provided 
by the agency (i.e., the level of aggregation at which the agency actually made its 
                                            
8 In many cases, these regulatory alternatives differed in terms of the stringency of the 
standard. For example, the four alternatives to DOE’s energy conservation standards 
for residential clothes washers were simply more and less stringent versions of the final 
standards. The standards were defined in terms of energy savings and water savings 
targets that could be met with existing technologies that were on the market.  
9 We checked whether proposed rules contained more information on rejected 
alternatives than final rules did. In general, they did not. We found 38 proposed policies 
(36 of which were rules issued by DOE) that provided sufficient information on net 
benefits of rejected alternatives. We analyzed these policies, and found that they 
support our main qualitative findings.  
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decisions among various alternatives). If we had aggregated the data further, we would 
have lost useful information about decisions that considered a range of alternatives.  
Our final data set for this exercise contained 43 policies that provided benefit and cost 
information on at least one rejected alternative other than the status quo and the 
preferred policy. Of those 43, we found 12 policies for which the inclusion of CO2 
benefits actually changed the alternative that maximized quantitative net benefits. We 
also found 20 of 43 policies where the inclusion of CO2 benefits changed the relative 
ranking of at least 2 alternatives. This change in ranking suggests that the SCC has had 
some effect on the economic analysis.  
Determining whether the change in ranking had an impact on the actual policy choice is 
more difficult. For 6 of the 12 policies where including CO2 benefits actually changed the 
alternative that maximized net benefits, the alternative with the highest quantified net 
benefits was actually selected. On the surface, this finding might appear to lend some 
support for the hypothesis that CO2 benefits were important in the final policy decision 
for a small, but non-trivial group of policies.  
There is a problem with this conclusion, however. There is no requirement in the 
presidential executive order governing regulations that says the policy with the 
maximum quantifiable net benefits must be selected. Furthermore, sometimes statutes 
limit the scope for actually selecting the alternative that maximizes net benefits. In the 
case of energy conservation standards, for example, the DOE uses seven statutory 
factors to determine whether the benefits of an energy conservation standard exceed its 
burdens. Those factors are (1) the economic impact on manufacturers and consumers, 
(2) operating cost savings, (3) energy and water savings, (4) reduction in product utility 
or performance, (5) reduction in competition, (6) need of the nation to conserve energy 
and water, and (7) other factors deemed relevant by the Secretary of Energy (42 U.S.C. 
6295(o)(2)(B)(i)). DOE can use these factors to justify a decision even if it has not 
included that factor in the relevant net benefit estimates.  That is, it can conclude that 
the costs of a policy exceed its benefits even though its estimated net benefits are large 
and positive. 
To obtain an estimate, admittedly crude, of the proportion of cases in which the addition 
of CO2 benefits affects regulatory decisions, we used the following equation: 
(1) % of cases in which including CO2 benefits changes the decision) =  
(Increase in the likelihood that a policy alternative is chosen from being ranked in 
the first position) x  
(% of cases in which including CO2 benefits moves a policy alternative to the first 
position)           
13 
We assume for simplicity that: the two terms on the right hand side of equation (1) are 
independent; that each regulation considers the same number of policy alternatives; 
and that all alternatives below the first position are equally likely to be chosen. The last 
assumption allows us to focus only on those cases where the SCC changes the top-
ranked alternative.10 Intuitively, we are trying to estimate the impact of the SCC in terms 
of the frequency with which using the SCC shifts a policy alternative to being ranked 
first, together with the “value” of being ranked first (in terms of making it more likely to 
be chosen by the agency). 
To compute the first term on the right hand side of equation (1), note that regulators 
selected the top ranked alternative in 58% of all cases (25 of 43). The average number 
of alternatives considered in in the 53 rules was 4.7. Assuming the remaining 
alternatives were equally likely to be chosen means that they each were selected 11% 
of the time.11 Taking the difference between 58% and 11% gives 47%, which provides a 
best estimate of the first term on the right hand side of equation (1). Our estimate of the 
second term is 12 of 43, or 28%. Multiplying these two percentages yields an estimate 
that the SCC may have changed decisions in about 13% of the cases.12 We conclude 
from this exercise that introduction of the SCC may have impacted the final decision in 
roughly 1 out of 8 cases.  
The preceding analysis is based on a stylized model that makes many assumptions. An 
alternative model that we constructed had the counterfactual consist of policies that 
were randomly selected. In that model, the impact of the SCC on decisions would 
generally be smaller than estimated here. Our goal here is simply to provide some novel 
estimates of the impact of the SCC. While recognizing that several different approaches 
exist, we do not pretend to be able to offer a precise final answer.  
4. Conclusion and areas for future research 
We evaluated a recent innovation in U.S. regulatory policy: the use of the social cost of 
carbon to value changes in emissions of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas. To assess 
whether outcomes were affected, we considered net benefits for 53 regulatory policies 
from 2008 through 2013, with and without estimates of the benefits associated with 
                                            
10 If the SCC does not move a policy’s rank to the first position, it does not change the 
“probability” that it is selected, so the SCC is assumed to have no impact on the likely 
choice of particular decisions. This allows us to focus only on those cases where the 
SCC moves a policy alternative to the first position.  
11 (1-.58) divided by 4.7.   
12 We examined the sensitivity of our results to the average number of alternatives. If 
there were 4 alternatives per rule, our formula for the impact of the SCC would yield 
12.3% instead of 13.1%. If there were 5 alternatives per rule, it would yield 13.3%. 
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changes in carbon dioxide emissions. We find that including the benefits from expected 
changes in carbon dioxide emissions does not typically affect the ranking of the 
preferred policy compared with the status quo. This is true even for policies explicitly 
aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions.  
In some cases, including benefits from reductions in emissions does change the relative 
ranking of different policy alternatives. We considered how changes in ranking were 
affected by the introduction of the SCC and found that including CO2 benefits may 
matter in roughly 1 of 8 cases.  
A general limitation of our quantitative analysis is that we take the regulatory benefits 
and costs calculated by the agency as given. We do not know the biases that exist in 
these data; and there is relatively little work that provides a definitive assessment on the 
nature of these biases (Hahn and Tetlock, 2008). One way of addressing the bias issue 
would be to do independent analyses of the economic benefits and costs of these 
rulemakings (Harrington, Morgenstern and Nelson, 2000). Such analyses are labor-
intensive, but could help furnish insights into the underlying political economy.13  
There are at least three key issues that are raised by this analysis, all of which deserve 
further scrutiny. One is the question of how the pattern in the data can be explained. 
The absence of a marked impact may be explained, in part, because U.S. regulators 
have succeeded in selecting the “low-hanging fruit,” where the net benefits of a policy 
that reduces carbon dioxide are positive. Another possible explanation was that the 
SCC was so small that it will never make a difference. We view this as highly unlikely in 
light of the findings presented above. CO2 benefits average roughly 15% of the net 
benefits for the data considered here. A further explanation, which we also rejected, is 
that our sample only considers economically significant regulations (e.g., regulations 
whose impact exceeds $100 million), which are likely to pass a benefit-cost test; 
otherwise, the argument is that they would not be proposed. We reject this argument 
based on the work of several regulatory scholars, which finds that many economically 
significant regulations do not pass a benefit-cost test even when using the government’s 
own numbers (Morrall, 1986; Hahn, 2000).  
A second critical issue is why the U.S. chose to implement the social cost of carbon, 
given that it appears to have made little actual difference for policy to date. One 
possible explanation is that regulators may have thought it was appropriate to value 
carbon in federal regulatory decisions related to climate, taking into account global 
damages. The Interagency Working Group reports support this view. An alternative 
                                            
13 We also conjecture that such an analysis could lead to a larger number of cases in 
which inclusion of the SCC changed the sign of net benefits of the policy from negative 
to positive. This is because some benefits that the agencies count may not be 
appropriate to count, or may be overstated. 
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explanation, not necessarily inconsistent with the former one, is that the SCC may have 
been attractive for the executive branch to pursue because it gave the appearance of 
doing something on climate policy (an issue that President Obama put high on his 
agenda). At the same time, Congress may have found this acceptable because it 
probably had little real impact on policy, at least so far. Finally, there may have been an 
expectation that estimates of the SCC may increase over time, and thus have a more 
pronounced impact on regulatory decisions (see, e.g., Moyer et al., 2014, forthcoming). 
A third issue relates to whether agencies are selecting policies that maximize expected 
net benefits. Frequently, an agency does not present sufficient information in the 
benefit-cost analysis to allow a reader to ascertain whether or not the outcome selected 
maximizes net benefits (Hahn and Tetlock, 2008). We know from the benefit-cost 
analyses reviewed here that agencies are generally selecting policies that have positive 
net benefits relative to the status quo. We do not know, whether the selected policy 
actually maximizes net benefits compared with other alternatives. We do know, 
however, from an earlier discussion that regulators selected the top ranked alternative 
in 58% of cases examined, meaning they did not do so in 42% of the cases. The 
selection of an economic alternative with lower quantified net benefits may have been 
made for several reasons, such as consideration for non-quantifiable benefits, concerns 
with equity, or politics.  
Regulatory agencies could address this issue by being clearer about the nature of the 
particular net benefit function they are trying to maximize (for example, specifying which 
externalities are included). They could also quantify the benefits and costs associated 
with a larger number of alternatives, so that the interested independent analyst could 
compare net benefits for different alternatives (Arrow et al, 1996). This is especially 
important to do for marginal net benefits. In the case of the SCC, we would conjecture 
that introduction of the SCC would likely make a difference for the optimal policy choice, 
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Appendix - Table A1 
Summary of Benefit-Cost Analyses 
 






Net Benefits not 
including CO2 
(Billions 2011$) 
Final Rules         
DOE / 2013 1904–AC04 ECSd for Distribution Transformers 18 13 
EPA / 2013 2060–AR13  NESHAP for Boilers and Process Heaters 47 47 
EPA / 2012 2060–AQ54 GHG Emissions Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles 460 410 
DOT / 2012 2127–AK79 CAFE Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles 490 440 
EPA / 2012 2060–AN72 Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries 0.55 0.50 
DOE / 2012 1904–AB90  ECS for Residential Clothes Washers 35 32 
DOE / 2012 1904–AC64 ECS for Residential Dishwashers 0.56 0.47 
EPA / 2012 
2060–AP52; 
2060–AR31 NESHAP for Steam Generating Units 57 57 
DOE / 2011 1904–AB50  ECS for Fluorescent Lamp Ballasts 19 18 
DOE / 2011 1904–AB79 ECS for Residential Refrigeration Products 43 34 
EPA, DOT / 
2011 
2060–AP61; 
2127–AK74 GHG and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles 51 45 
EPA / 2011 2060–AP50  Interstate Transport of Particulate Matter and Ozone 210 210 
DOE / 2011 1904–AC06 
Energy Efficiency Standards for Residential Furnaces, A/C, and Heat Pumps 
Standards for Standby/Off Mode for Residential Furnaces, A/C, and Heat Pumps 
20 17 
1.5 1.2 
DOE / 2011 1904–AA89  
ECS for Residential Clothes Dryers 





EPA / 2011 2060–AO12  Standards of Performance and Emission Guidelines for Waste Incinerators 0.32 0.32 
EPA / 2011 2060–AQ25 NESHAP for Major Sources 38 38 
EPA / 2011 2060–AM44  NESHAP for Area Sources* -0.13 -0.13 




CAFE Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles 





DOE / 2010 1904–AA90 
ECS for Residential Water Heaters 
ECS for Direct Heating Equipment 







DOE / 2010 1904–AB70 ECS for Small Electric Motors 15 13 
DOE / 2010 1904–AB93 ECS for Commercial Clothes Washers 1.0 0.93 
EPA / 2010 
2060–AO15, 
2060–AO42 NESHAP and NSPS for Portland Cement Plants 13 13 
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EPA / 2010 2060–AO38 Control of Emissions from New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines 85 85 
DOT / 2010 2120–AI92 ADS-B Out Performance Requirements to Support Air Traffic Control Service 0.41 0.28 
DOE / 2009 1904–AB58 
ECS for Class A Beverage Vending Machines 





DOE / 2009 1904–AA92 
ECS for General Service Fluorescent Lamps 





DOE / 2009 1904–AB49 ECS for Conventional Cooking Products 0.91 0.78 
DOE / 2009 1904–AB59 ECS for Commercial Refrigeration Products 4.7 4.2 
DOE / 2009 1904–AB74 ECS for Certain Consumer Products and Commercial and Industrial Equipment 130 110 
DOE / 2008 1904–AB44 Packaged Terminal A/C and Heat Pump ECS 0.068 0.058 
 
Proposed Rules with no Final Rules in this data set     
DOE / 2013 1904–AC00 ECS for Metal Halide Lamp Fixtures 4.0 2.5 
EPA / 2013 2040–AF14 
Effluent Limitations Standards for new Steam Electric Power Generators* 





DOE / 2012 1904–AB57 
ECS for Class B,C,D,E External Power Supplies  
ECS for Class X External Power Supplies 
ECS for Class H External Power Supplies 
ECS for Class 1 Battery Chargers 
ECS for Class 2,3,4 Battery Chargers  
ECS for Class 5,6 Battery Chargers 
ECS for Class 7 Battery Chargers 
ECS for Class 8 Battery Chargers  



















DOE / 2012 1904–AC07 ECS for Microwave Ovens 4.4 3.7 
EPA / 2011 
2060–AR15; 
2050–AG44 Solid Waste Incinerators: Reconsideration and Proposed Amendments 0.31 0.31 
EPA / 2011 2060–AN99  NESHAP for Mercury Cell Chlor-Alkali Plants 0.021 0.014 
EPA / 2010 2060–AP90 
Standards of Performance and Emission Guidelines for Sewage Sludge 
Incinerators 0.13 0.13 
 
 
                                            
* These rules are not shown in the figures because they have negative net benefits with and without valuing CO2. 
a Year of publication in the Federal Register. 
b For rules that contained a single central cost-benefit analysis, we report the subject of the rule.  Otherwise, we report the subject of the relevant subpart. 
c All estimates are rounded to two significant digits, and use a 3% discount rate. 
d ECS: Energy Conservation Standards; NESHAP: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; CAFE: Corporate Average Fuel Economy; and  
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NSPS: New Source Performance Standards. 
